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We investigated the capacity of internal border control 
to limit inﬂ  uenza spread in an emergent pandemic in the 
context of Australia, a country with a low-population density 
and geopolitical boundaries that may facilitate restrictions. 
Mathematical models were used to study the time delay be-
tween epidemics in 2 population centers when travel restric-
tions were imposed. The models demonstrated that popula-
tion size, travel rates, and places where travelers reside can 
strongly inﬂ  uence delay. The model simulations suggested 
that moderate delays in geographic spread may be possible 
with stringent restrictions and a low reproduction number, 
but results will be sensitive to the reproduction number and 
timing of restrictions. Model limitations include the absence 
of further importations and additional control measures. In-
ternal border control may have a role in protecting domestic 
centers early in a pandemic, when importations are sparse. 
Our results may be useful for policymakers.
C
ommercial air travel has increased dramatically since 
the last pandemic of inﬂ  uenza (1). The number of in-
ternational tourist arrivals recorded worldwide in 2004 was 
763.2 million; 43% of these arrivals were by air (2). This 
increase in international travel has heightened the risk for 
the global spread of infectious diseases (1).
Long-distance domestic routes also carry high vol-
umes of travelers: an estimated 40.4 million passengers 
traveled on Australian domestic airlines in the year end-
ing June 30, 2005 (3), and 660 million traveled on US 
domestic airlines during 2005 (4). Rapid and accessible 
long-distance transportation facilitates the geographic 
spread of diseases, even those, such as inﬂ  uenza, that 
have a short incubation period (5).
If an inﬂ  uenza pandemic emerges, the ﬁ  rst attempts to 
control its spread are likely to be made at its source, as 
suggested in recent modeling papers (6,7). However, if 
these strategies fail, individual governments will need to 
implement strategies to manage the pandemic when it ar-
rives on their borders. In addition to well-publicized op-
tions for control, including antiviral prophylaxis and quar-
antine (6,7), travel restrictions, both external and internal, 
may play a role in reducing the geographic spread of the 
virus (8–11)
Restrictions on travel can have a sizeable economic and 
social impact, as seen in affected nations during the crisis 
with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). In many 
countries, stringent travel restrictions will not be feasible 
because of high population densities and highly connected 
networks of transportation, infrastructure, and trade. These 
caveats do not apply to Australia, an island comparable in 
size to the United States but with a population of only 20 
million. This population is concentrated in 5 large cities, 
along with smaller centers, primarily along its eastern and 
southern coastlines. These centers are widely separated; 
travel between them is primarily by air. During the 1918 
pandemic, Australia delayed the onset of the pandemic by 
1 year by imposing external border control (12).
We used mathematical models to make predictions 
about the effectiveness of travel restrictions and to explore 
the sensitivity of these predictions to disease and demo-
graphic factors. Typically, modeling studies of inﬂ  uenza 
spread are focused on predicting international or national 
spread between major hubs on the global air-transporta-
tion network (8,9,13), which is certainly important. In 
contrast, we examine the effects of travel restrictions on 
2-city routes with differing characteristics. This simpler 
setting allows a more detailed exploration of how the de-
lay between epidemics in 2 connected locations depends on 
travel restrictions, population sizes, travel rates, residence 
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of travelers, and the transmissibility of the inﬂ  uenza virus, 
with relevance to large and small centers. The analysis as-
sumes case-patients arriving from overseas have a negli-
gible effect, so the results apply primarily during the early 
stage of a pandemic. Simulating the effect of internal travel 
restrictions in Australia is relevant to countries with similar 
demographic characteristics, such as Russia, Canada, and 
New Zealand. The aims of our analysis were to explore the 
role of travel restrictions in slowing the geographic spread 
of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic and to simulate the effects of such 
restrictions in the context of Australia.
Methods
Two simple scenarios (Figure 1A) were used to as-
sess the likely impact of travel restrictions on the spread 
of a pandemic in Australia. In the ﬁ  rst, it was assumed 
that the initial cases occurred in Sydney. The growth of 
this epidemic and its resultant spread to Melbourne in 
the presence of travel restrictions were simulated. This 
scenario is indicative of the spread to other large centers 
with similar travel volumes. In the second scenario, the 
initial case was assumed to occur in Darwin, a smaller 
Australian city in close proximity to Southeast Asia, and 
the growth of this epidemic and spread to Sydney were 
simulated. The Darwin-to-Sydney scenario, with a com-
paratively low travel volume, represents the situation of 
containing the epidemic within a smaller town through 
the use of travel restrictions. Key parameters and assump-
tions are summarized in Table 1.
Data
Average daily volumes of domestic air travel between 
Sydney, Melbourne, and Darwin were obtained from the 
Australian Domestic Airline Activity report (17). Only 
direct ﬂ  ights were considered. Seasonal variations in the 
volume of air trafﬁ  c were not taken into account. Approxi-
mately 78% of the trafﬁ  c from Sydney to Melbourne and 
70% of the trafﬁ  c from the Northern Territory to the eastern 
Australian states is by air (18).
As a separate indicator of travel volumes that incorpo-
rates the average length of stay and information on the ori-
gin of travelers, we used survey estimates of nights stayed 
by domestic visitors to the 3 study destinations (Melbourne, 
Sydney, and Darwin). The data were obtained from the 
state government tourism websites for Victoria (20), New 
South Wales (NSW) (19), and the Northern Territory (21). 
Because details on visitor origin were only obtained at the 
state level, we assumed that each person in that state would 
make an equal contribution to visitor nights in the desti-
nation city. These values were then used to estimate the 
proportions of the travel volume due to each of the 2 cities 
on a route and to modify force of infection calculations by 
incorporating the average length of stay. The travel rates 
(weighted by length of stay) used in the simulations are 
provided in Table 1. Demographic data on cities and states 
were acquired from the Australian Bureau of Statistics pop-
ulation estimates for 2004 (16).
Model Structure
Simulations of inﬂ  uenza epidemics were computed by 
using a stochastic SIR model, in which the population is 
separated into 3 mutually exclusive classes: susceptible (S), 
infectious (I), and recovered (R). A stochastic model can 
capture random variation near the beginning of an epidem-
ic, when the number of infectious persons is small. Homo-
geneous mixing is assumed, i.e., all susceptible members of 
the population in a city are equally likely to be infected by 
a given infectious person.
A schematic of the model is given in Figure 1B, and 
the deﬁ  ning equations are presented in the online Appendix, 
part A (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/7/ 
1038-app.htm). The model evolves in discrete time, with 
the step length equal to 1 day. This time frame accords with 
real-life epidemics, for which incidence and other epide-
Figure 1. Schematic of travel locations and model. A) Model schematic showing the SIR (susceptible, infectious, and recovered) classes 
and travel connecting the cities; B) locations of the cities and routes used in the model; C) the form of the 2 infectivity functions used to 
simulate the infectivity of persons over the course of their infection. RESEARCH
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miologic data are usually recorded daily. The discrete time 
structure simpliﬁ  es the introduction of a variable infectivity 
proﬁ  le, incorporating a latent, noninfectious period and a 
changing degree of infectivity for each person during the 
course of his or her illness. This feature of the model is 
supported by virus-shedding studies (22) and enables us 
to contrast the effect of a highly peaked infectivity proﬁ  le, 
similar to that used by Ferguson et al. (6), with the effect of 
a constant infectivity proﬁ  le (7), as depicted in Figure 1C.
A key factor governing the effectiveness of our travel 
restrictions is the average doubling time of the attack rate 
during the early stages of the epidemic, when growth is ex-
ponential. The doubling time is determined by the basic re-
production number (R0), deﬁ  ned as the average number of 
secondary infections due to a single primary infected per-
son in a completely susceptible population, and the form 
of the infectivity proﬁ  le. The infectivity proﬁ  le primarily 
inﬂ  uences the growth rate through the mean time (or serial 
interval) between cases: ≈2.8 days for the peaked infectiv-
ity function and 4 days for the ﬂ  at infectivity function used 
here. The doubling time depends linearly on the serial in-
terval so that epidemics that use the peaked infectivity pro-
ﬁ  le double in size almost 1.5× as quickly as epidemics that 
use the ﬂ  at infectivity proﬁ  le, for the same value of R0. The 
infectivity proﬁ  le and R0 depend on properties of the patho-
gen and on social, environmental, and genetic factors.
Although inﬂ  uenza appears to be a highly infectious 
disease, with regular winter epidemics, this is largely due to 
its short incubation period and genetic drift, which nulliﬁ  es 
preexisting immunity. Thus, literature estimates of the ef-
fective reproduction number for inﬂ  uenza are typically <4 
(14) (whereas for measles R0 is 20 [15]), although in local-
ized outbreaks it can be considerably higher (23). We take 
R0 to be in the range 1.5–3.5, which corresponds to attack 
rates of 58%–97% (including subclinical infections) in a 
population without prior immunity or behavioral changes 
in response to the pandemic.
The total period of infection, including latent period, 
was assumed to be 6 days (7). For each infectivity proﬁ  le, 
the latent period was ≈1 day, which is at the low end of 
literature estimates (other researchers have used values of 
1–4 days [8,9,24]). Spread from city to city is incorporated 
by assuming that each person is equally likely to travel; 
the daily travel rates were estimated from the data sources 
described above. This assumption was pessimistic, since 
symptomatic infected persons may not travel, but it did not 
greatly inﬂ  uence the results (online Appendix, part A).
Travel restrictions were implemented as a reduction of 
the rate of all forms of travel. For this analysis, reductions 
of 80%, 90%, and 99% were compared with the base case 
of unrestricted travel. The values of 80% and 90% might be 
realistic reduction targets, whereas the value of 99% indi-
cates what near-perfect compliance might achieve. Travel 
restrictions were switched on in the model at some time 
(measured in weeks) after the initial case occurred and re-
mained on for the rest of the simulations.
The principal measure used in this analysis for gauging 
the effect of travel restrictions is T20, the delay between the 
epidemic’s becoming established in city 1 and taking off 
in city 2. We considered the outbreak to have taken off in 
a city once there were 20 current infectious cases—hence, 
the notation T20 for the delay between the epidemics. This 
choice conveniently limited comparisons to simulated epi-
demics that do take off. Since the model is stochastic, T20 
is random, and the results shown in the graphs are for m20, 
the median value for outbreaks that take off. Ranges, when 
given, cover 90% of outbreak simulations.
Table 1. Summary of parameter values, assumptions, and sources used in models of the effect of travel restrictions on pandemic 
influenza in Australia* 
Variable/concept Value (range)/assumption Source/interpretation 
Reproduction no. (R0) 1.5–3.5 Mills (14)
Infectivity function (ρ) Flat or peaked†  Longini, Ferguson (7,8)
Latent period  1 (1–2 in sensitivity analysis) d(s)  Ferguson (6)
Infectious period  5 d  Literature suggests 4–7 d in adults (6,7)
Mixing Homogenous (within city)  Modeling literature (15)
Propensity to travel  Everyone equal  Assumption
Populations Sydney (4.2 million), Melbourne  
(3.6 million), Darwin (110,000) 
ABS figures (16)
Travel rate‡ Sydney   Melbourne 
(weighted by stay length) 
(4.7 × 10
3, 8.9 × 10
3) BTRE figures (17,18), NSW, and  
Victoria Tourism reports (19,20)
Travel rate‡ Sydney   Darwin  
(weighted by stay length) 
(9.2 × 10
4, 4.4 × 10
3) BTRE figures (17,18), NSW, and  
NT Tourism reports (19,21)
Travel restrictions  20%,10%, or 1% of current levels  Assumption
Time between 20 current cases  
in city 1 and city 2 (T20)
Random variable (T20), different for  
each simulation. Median value over  
all simulations is given by m20.
Output variables used to measure  
effect of travel restrictions 
*ABS, Australian Bureau of Statistics; BTRE, Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics; NSW, New South Wales; NT, Northern Territory. 
†See Figure 1, panel C, for shapes used. 
‡This assumes a constant travel rate over the year with no seasonal variation in travel volumes. Internal Border Control and Spread of Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza
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The simulations were run with MATLAB version 7.04 
(The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) with Poisson random 
variables simulated by the poissrnd function in version 
5.02 of the Statistics Toolbox (MathWorks). Our results 
are based on 10,000 runs of the model.
Motivated by the results of the simulation study, we 
then analyzed the effects of city size and travel rates by us-
ing a deterministic approximation of the above model (de-
tails given in the online Appendix, part B). This approxi-
mation has the advantage of being much simpler to use in 
analyzing sensitivity to these factors, while reproducing the 
average behavior of the stochastic model.
Results
Scenario 1 (Sydney to Melbourne)
The median and mean numbers of days until there are 
20 infectious persons in Sydney for an epidemic that began 
with 1 infectious person in Sydney on day 0 are presented 
in Table 2. Figure 2 illustrates how m20, the median time 
between the day when the number of infected persons ﬁ  rst 
reached 20 in Sydney and the day when the number of in-
fected persons ﬁ  rst reached 20 in Melbourne, depends on 
R0, the form of the infectivity proﬁ  le, and the timing and 
severity of travel restrictions.
Each of the graphs covers 1 of the 6 combinations of 
the 3 values of R0 and 2 infectivity proﬁ  les. The 4 curves 
shown on each graph describe the median values for each 
of the 4 levels of travel restrictions (none, 80%, 90%, and 
99%), applied at delays from importation of the ﬁ  rst case 
from 0 to 6 weeks (8 weeks for R0 = 1.5). The gray panes 
highlight the time during which the epidemic grows from 
20 to 1,000 cases in Sydney.
The travel restrictions are most effective for the opti-
mistic assumption R0 = 1.5 and constant infectivity (Fig-
ure 2A). Figure 2B and C more closely resemble the epi-
demic growth rates used in recent modeling papers (6,7). 
In Figure 2B (R0 = 1.5, peaked infectivity), an increase in 
m20 from 22 to 32 days is seen for 80% restrictions, with 
a further increase to 52 days for 99% restrictions, if ap-
plied immediately. These improvements appear robust for 
delays of up to 4 weeks, but in fact a sizeable proportion 
of the simulations have spread to Melbourne by this point. 
This effect is illustrated in Figure 3A and B, in which we 
compare the full distribution of T20 in the presence of 99% 
travel restrictions applied at the 2- and 4-week marks, re-
spectively. Both distributions are bimodal, but in Figure 
3B, the ﬁ  rst mode is substantial. This difference arises 
because a large proportion of simulated outbreaks spread 
to Melbourne between the 2- and 4-week marks for this 
combination of disease parameters, a ﬁ  nding that empha-
sizes that timing can be critical for the success of travel 
restrictions. Under the pessimistic assumption of R0 = 3.5 
and peaked infectivity, the impact of travel restrictions is 
muted, and a delay of just 2 weeks renders the restrictions 
ineffective.
Scenario 2 (Darwin to Sydney)
For an epidemic originating in Darwin, the median 
times until there are 20 infectious persons in Darwin are 
almost identical to those for scenario 1 (Table 2), although 
the 90% ranges are a little wider. In this scenario, m20 is the 
median time between the ﬁ  rst day on which there are 20 
infected persons in Darwin and the ﬁ  rst day on which there 
are 20 currently infected persons in Sydney. The effects of 
R0, the infectivity function, and the delay in and severity of 
travel restrictions are captured in Figure 4. 
These results, presented in the same format as Figure 
2, show 2 key differences from those in scenario 1. The 
median delay, m20, is shorter in scenario 2, given the same 
combination of disease parameters, as is the time interval 
over which restrictions can be applied effectively. This 
ﬁ   nding appears counterintuitive because the volume of 
travelers on the Darwin-to-Sydney route is much smaller 
than that on the Sydney-to-Melbourne route.
By using the simpler model described in the online 
Appendix, part B, we performed a sensitivity analysis (on-
line Appendix Figure, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/7/1038-appG.htm) on the effect of city size and 
travel rates on epidemic spread. This analysis implies that 
in scenario 2, in which there is a large difference in popula-
tion size (Darwin:Sydney ≈1:40), infection of susceptible 
travelers from Sydney is the primary reason for the rapid 
intercity spread, despite the lower rate of travel for Sydney 
residents on this route. The online Appendix Figure, panel 
B, shows that this effect would be reduced if the rate at 
which Sydney residents travel to Darwin were much lower 
than that for Darwin residents traveling to Sydney. Such a 
reduction could be achieved by applying tighter restrictions 
on Sydney-based travelers.
Table 2. No. days for an influenza epidemic beginning in Sydney to total 20 currently infectious cases* 
Constant infectivity profile† Peaked infectivity profile†
R0 Median, d  90% range, d  Mean, d  Median, d  90% range, d  Mean, d 
1.5 24 13–46 25.9 15 8–31 16.4
2.5 12 8–21 13.0 8 5–14 8.4
3.5 9 6–14 9.5 6 4–10 6.2
*R0,reproduction number. 
†The constant infectivity profile assumes that a person is equally infectious throughout their infectious period; the peaked infectivity profile assumes that 
they are most infectious early in the infectious period (see Figure 1, panel C, for the profiles used). RESEARCH
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The ratio of city populations also inﬂ  uences the time 
interval when restrictions can be applied effectively. Travel 
restrictions were less effective if applied after the time at 
which there were 20 current cases in Darwin (Figure 4). 
This feature was illustrated by Figure 3C and D which 
show the full distributions of T20 for 2- and 4-week delays 
in restrictions, respectively. For a 2-week delay (Figure 
4C), most outbreaks were delayed but a sizeable minority 
were not. A 4-week delay (Figure 4D) nulliﬁ  ed any impact 
of the restrictions for this scenario. If, however, travel re-
strictions were applied immediately after the ﬁ  rst case was 
detected, the increase in T20 due to restrictions was almost 
identical to the increases described in scenario 1.
Now consider a situation in which a small isolated 
center (town A, population 1,000) attempts to remain pan-
demic free. Let us assume that on any given day, N visitors 
stay in the town, and N town members visit pandemic-af-
fected regions. A simple stochastic model of disease spread 
(online Appendix, part D) can predict the probability that 
the outbreak can be kept out of town A in terms of N and 
R0 (online Appendix, part D). Predictions from this model 
agree well with simulations, as shown in the online Ap-
pendix Figure, panel C. These results indicate that travel 
restrictions are likely to prevent an outbreak if N is reduced 
to ≈1/10 per day.
Sensitivity to Other Factors
The sensitivity of the results to the duration of infec-
tion and form of the infectivity function were entirely a re-
sult of the change in the epidemic growth rate. If, for exam-
ple, an additional day of latent infection were added, then 
the delays in spread, when the ﬂ  at and peaked infectivity 
functions were used, were ≈25% and ≈37% longer, respec-
tively, which is a considerable effect. However, epidemic 
Figure 2. For an epidemic beginning in Sydney, the value of the median time delay, m20, in the presence of travel restrictions applied at a 
delay of 0–6 weeks (10 and 8 weeks in [A] and [B], respectively). Assumptions are A) reproduction number (R0) = 1.5, constant infectivity 
proﬁ  le; B) R0 = 1.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le; C) R0 = 2.5, constant infectivity proﬁ  le; D) R0 = 2.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le; E) R0 = 3.5, 
constant infectivity proﬁ  le; F) R0 = 3.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le. The gray panes cover the periods when the epidemic grows from 20 to 
1,000 infected people in Sydney; dotted, dashed, dash-dotted, and solid lines correspond to 99%, 90%, 80% and no travel restrictions, 
respectively.
Figure 3. Distributions, based on 10,000 simulations, of the time delay, T20, given reproduction number (R0) = 1.5 and the peaked infectivity 
function, with 99% travel restrictions imposed in scenario 1 (A) and (B) and scenario 2 (C) and (D). Scenario 1 simulates an epidemic 
beginning in Sydney and spreading to Melbourne. In scenario 2, the epidemic begins in Darwin and spreads to Sydney. In (A) and (C), the 
restrictions are imposed after 2 weeks; in (B) and (D), they are imposed after 4 weeks.Internal Border Control and Spread of Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza
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growth rates in past pandemics are typically not consistent 
with longer latent periods and low values of R0, so these 
additional delays should be viewed with caution.
The sensitivity to the estimated travel volumes was rela-
tively weak: increasing or reducing travel by a factor of 2 in 
each direction increases or reduces the delay by 1.5–7 days, 
and 4.5 or 2.5 days as compared to data in Figures 2 and 4, 
respectively. These results are consistent for both scenarios.
Discussion
The simulations we describe showed that although 
travel restrictions might delay the spread of an inﬂ  uenza 
epidemic between 2 cities by several weeks, this delay is 
highly sensitive to assumptions about the transmissibility 
of the inﬂ  uenza virus. A more surprising result is that the 
delay is also sensitive to the ratio of city sizes, differences 
in travel rates, and the originating city. In particular, the 
modeling suggests that if the epidemic begins in a smaller 
town, restricting visitors from entering or leaving that town 
is important.
Moderate delays in the pandemic could be achievable 
when the epidemic growth rate is low. The growth rate can 
be estimated from case counts during an epidemic and used 
in a simple formula to predict the delay due to travel restric-
tions (online Appendix, part D). These predictions could 
provide practical estimates of the beneﬁ  ts of longer term 
travel restrictions based on the ﬁ  rst clusters of cases dur-
ing an outbreak. For smaller communities with low travel 
rates, the probability of preventing an outbreak can also 
be estimated (online Appendix, part D), with good agree-
ment with the results of our simulations (online Appendix 
Figure, panel C). If the estimated growth rate is high (e.g., 
assumptions used in Figures 2 and 4 with R0 = 3.5, peaked 
infectivity), the additional median delay between 20 cases 
occurring in city 1 and 20 cases occurring in city 2 might be 
just 3 days, providing little beneﬁ  t from longer term imple-
mentation of travel restrictions
Our results do not account for additional importations. 
Thus, they are most applicable to the arrival of a pandemic 
in Australia, while the pandemic outside Australia remains 
contained or border control is effective. Our simulated de-
lays will be overestimates if additional importations are 
substantial. Another concern is that stringent travel restric-
tions may be required for several weeks to maximize de-
lays in spread. Inevitably, such restrictions would cause 
economic and social disruption, which must be balanced 
against any beneﬁ  ts from delaying the domestic spread of 
an epidemic.
If combined with restrictions on overseas travel, re-
strictions on internal travel may have a role in pandemic 
control, even for major centers. However, the economic 
impact of restrictions in major centers could be enormous, 
with severe consequences for service and travel industries, 
as seen in the SARS crisis (25), and the potential to affect 
trade and other sections of the economy. Some of the ben-
eﬁ  ts and costs of reduced travel may also accrue without 
restrictions, with persons avoiding travel because of per-
ceived risks. Our modeling suggests that travel restrictions 
could have a greater effect in more isolated communities 
that lack international ports.
Figure 4. For an epidemic beginning in Darwin, the value of the median time delay, m20, in the presence of travel restrictions applied at 
a delay of 0–6 weeks (8 weeks in [A] and [B], respectively). Assumptions are (A) reproduction number (R0) = 1.5, constant infectivity 
proﬁ  le; (B) R0 = 1.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le; (C) R0 = 2.5, constant infectivity proﬁ  le; (D) R0 = 2.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le; (E) R0 = 3.5, 
constant infectivity proﬁ  le; (F) R0 = 3.5, peaked infectivity proﬁ  le. The gray panes cover the periods when the epidemic grows from 20 to 
1,000 infected people in Darwin. Dotted, dashed, dash-dotted, and solid lines correspond to 99%, 90%, 80%, and no travel restrictions, 
respectively.RESEARCH
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The travel restrictions we discussed have been exam-
ined in isolation, without consideration of other disease 
control measures. Other measures could lower the effective 
value of the reproduction number, or even curtail the epi-
demic; in these circumstances, reducing all travel by only 
80% might be beneﬁ  cial. Alternatively, if the R0, is much 
higher than used here (23), internal travel restrictions would 
be ineffective. Limitations of our modeling approach are 
summarized in Table 3.
The key points in our study are that delays induced by 
internal border control are strongly inﬂ  uenced by epidemic 
growth rates and demographic factors such as the relative 
sizes of cities, travel rates, and the origin of travelers. When 
used without other control measures, stopping at least 99% 
of travel would be required to signiﬁ  cantly increase time 
available for vaccine production and distribution. Although 
any delay in spread might be attractive for logistical pur-
poses, the economic impact of such restrictions may be 
prohibitive if sustained for more than a few days. In view 
of these points, the situation in which they might be most 
applicable for extended use is in the protection of small, 
relatively isolated centers.
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